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Abstract
In this paper we introduce basic notions of a new economic model where preference
relations on commodities set are represented by a group action on Euclidean space
instead of utility function. Conditions that ensure the existence of individual
demand function and a general equilibrium in the setting of exchange economy are
examined.
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INTRODUCTION
The mathematical modern conception of general economic equilibrium (GEE) is
provided by Arrow-Debreu model developed from 1950 (Arrow, Debreu 1954). This
model pictures the economy as a collection of m economic agents who make supply and
demand decisions over a nite set of l commodities in order to further their own
interests. The general equilibrium research program then studies many properties of eco-
nomy, particularly the price, choices of agents, individual and aggregated demand func-
tions (Balasko, 1998).
In a pure exchange model, all agents are consumers, and each of them is provided with
a preference relation represented by a utility function on R
l
and an initial endowment
e 2 R
+
l
representing his supply oer in the market. Agents are assumed to take as given
the market prices of goods. In exchange for his supply, each agent tries to choose the
consumption bundle which maximizes his utility given his budget constraint. Such
bundle represents the individual demand. Aggregated demand of an economy is the sum
of all individual ones, and it is clearly a function of price.
Equilibrium, is by denition the vector price p 2 R
l
which makes all markets clear
(Supply = Demand). The centerpiece of the subject (GEE) deals with the existence and
properties of equilibrium. To ensure an armative answer to that question, many condi-
tions on preference relations, and hence on utility functions, are assumed. In summary,
it is assumed that preferences are continuous, monotonic and convex, or equivalently,
utility functions are dierentiable and concave. When these conditions hold for all
agents, the economy is then called neoclassical, and equilibrium prices can be reached
(Aliprantis & al, 1989).
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The aim of this paper is to build a new general formulation of consumers' choice where
rationality involves not only maximization of preference, but also a well dened reference
of choice, hence our terminology of Economy of Referential Preference (ERP). Although
it is clear that this approach can replace, in many instances, the conventional one based
on utility function, it is not our main purpose in this paper. In some way, we prouve
here that the rationality of economic agents can be treated in a dirent manner than by
utility function.
In rst section we treat several examples that show the consistency of the group action
approach and we explicitly determine the individual demand function. In section two
we give a basic denition of an ERP and we end by proving our main result (theorem 8)
establishing the existence of an equilibrium in such economy.
1. Motivations and examples of referential preference
In this section it is shown by examples that preference relations on commodities set can
be represented by a group action on R
l
. This viewpoint sheds some new light on the eco-
nomic rationality and conditions of equilibrium. In this work we will touch only a few
aspects of group theory and knowledge of elementary matricial calculus is sucient ( see
Roman, 2012, for details and many examples of group action).
We begin by a simple example where we can see that indierence sets of utility function
may be represented, or more precisely replaced by group action on R
l
. Here and sub-
sequently, R
+
l
denotes the positive cone of R
l
, and R
++
l
=

x2R
l
/x
i
> 0; 16 i6 l
	
.
Example 1 The commodity space is R
+
2
and the utility function u is:
u:R
+
2
 R; u

x
y

=xy :
We choose the one-parameter's subgroup G of GL(2; R), G =

 
a 0
0
1
a
!
; a 2 R
+


. The
action  of G on R
2
is simply the Matricial one on the Euclidean space, namely:

g

x
y

=
 
ax
1
a
y
!
; where g=
 
a 0
0
1
a
!
for some a> 0:
We assert that indierence sets of u are exactly the orbits for vectors on R
+
2
.
Indeed, except the trivial case (c = 0) which is obviously a union of two orbits, x c > 0
and the indierence set I
c
=
n

x
y

2R
+
2
; u

x
y

= c
o
: Given any commodity

x
0
y
0

2 I
c
,
his orbit is nothing but I
c
itself. Actually, for any g =
 
a 0
0
1
a
!
2 G, it is clear that

g

x
0
y
0

=
 
ax
0
1
a
y
0
!
2 I
c
. Conversely, any commodity

x~
y~

2 I
c
is in the orbit of

x
0
y
0

,
since

x~
y~

=
0
B
@
x~
x
0
0
0
y~
y
0
1
C
A

x
0
y
0

=
 
a 0
0
1
a
!

x
0
y
0

where a=
x~
x
0
=
1
y~
y
0
which is due to the fact
that x
0
y
0
= c=x~y~ .
It remains to show that any orbit is an indierence set. This can be deduced from the
fact that (ax)(
1
a
y) =xy, and for all

x~
y~

such that x~y~= xy we have
0
@
x~
x
0
0
y~
y
1
A

x
y

=

x~
y~

.
As indierence set I
c
is arbitrary, this is sucient to conclude that the description of
indierence sets of consumer with given utility function u can be eciently made by a
group actions onR
+
2
.
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This example gains in interest only if we are able to see how group action becomes
useful to dene a mathematical framework of consumer's theory and general equilibrium.
In other words, we have to dene a complete preordering relation on R
+
l
and a consumer
maximization problem in this new setting.
Actually, let G a topological group and  a continuous action of G on R
l
. Here and
subsequently, O
x
denotes the orbit of x 2R
l
under group action. It is easy to check that
any group action induces an equivalence relation on R
l
. Indeed, such equivalence can be
obviously dened as following:
x y i 9g 2G st 
g
(x)= y .
But since this is not sucient to give a totally (complete) preorder on R
+
l
, some other
conditions are needed.
Axiom 1
Let X a non-empty subset of R
l
. For all x 2X; there is a unique v 2R
+
such that x 2
O
vI
l
where I
l
=
0
@
1


1
1
A
2R
l
:
We will denote by v
x
the unique real v such that we have x2O
vI
l
.
Of course this implies that the quotient of X by the equivalence relation induced by the
action of group is identied with R
+
.
Clearly, we can deduce a preference relation on X from a group action which veries
axiom 1. Indeed, we say that x is more desirable than y when v
x
>v
y
, and they are equi-
valent if v
x
= v
y
.
We simply note, that v
x
= v
y
 9g 2G such that 
g
(x) = y x y.
The above axiom is not only a simple mathematical hypothesis, but it has an evident
economic meaning which asserts that consumer compares each bundle with a very simple
one which is v:I
l
= v:
0
@
1


1
1
A
. By identifying v:I
l
and v 2 R, further analysis may eventu-
ally lead to interpret v:I
l
in terms of a medium of exchange. But this is still just a mere
eventuality.
In many examples, axiom 1 is available for all R
+
l
and the above preference can be
extended to all commodities on R
+
l
. When this is not the case we assume that all x 2
R
++
l
are preferred to anything on the the boundary. Taking into account this detail, we
state the following denition:
Denition 1.
We say that a preference relation < on commodity set R
+
l
is of reference type, or refer-
ential, whenever either
1. It is given by a continuous and globally invariant group action on R
+
l
which satis-
es axiom 1.
2. It is given by a continuous and globally invariant group action on R
++
l
which sat-
ises axiom 1, and everything in R
++
l
is preferred to anything on the boundary.
Returning to the previous example, where u(x
1
; x
2
) = x
1
x
2
, we can see that x 4 y
u(x) 6 u(y) v
x
6 v
y
. Actually, u(x) 6 u(y) x
1
x
2
6 y
1
y
2
, but since (v
x
; v
x
) 2 O
x
and (v
y
; v
y
) 2 O
y
, we have v
x
2
= x
1
x
2
and v
y
2
= y
1
y
2
. Under the condition v
x
; v
y
> 0 it fol-
lows that v
x
6 v
y
.
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Now we will solve a simple problem of consumer's demand with no use of utility func-
tion. The group G are the same as in example 1.
Example 2. Let p=

1
2
;
3
p
2

the price vector and w = 200 the budget of the consumer.
To solve the consumer's problem which is

Maximize v
x
subject to the constraint p x6w
, we set that x =
 
t 0
0
1
t
!

v
x
v
x

for some t and v
x
2 R
+

. It's not dicult to verify that t and v
x
exist and
that they are unique. Actually, if x=

x
1
x
2

2R
++
2
, then we can see that v
x
= x
1
x
2
p
and
t=
x
1
x
2
q
. The budget constraint becomes:

p;
 
t 0
0
1
t
!

v
x
v
x


=w 
1
2
tv
x
+
3
p
2t
v
x
=200  v
x
=
400t
t
2
+ 3
p
.
We then obtain v
x
(t) =
400t
t
2
+ 3
p
, that reaches its maximum at t = 3
4
p
, for which we have
v
x
=200( 3
4
p
)
 1
.
Finally, the solution of this maximization problem gives us x =
 
200
200 3
p
3
!
as the con-
sumer's demand.
To treat the general case we must give necessary and/or sucient conditions on groups
and their actions to ensure reliability and eciency of axiom preference and so the exist-
ence of individual demand function. Indeed, under the axiom 1, we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 2. Let a consumer with referential preference on R
+
l
given by a group G.
Then, the maximization problem under the budget constraint is equivalent to the minim-
ization of a nonnegative continuous real valued function on the group G.
Proof. Since referential preferences are determined by v = v
x
where x = v
x
 
g
(
I
)
, then
the demand function is given by the solution of the following problem:

Maximize v
x
subject to the budget constraint
h
p; x
i
=w
This maximization problem is clearly equivalent to nding the maximal value of v, such
that
h
p; v 
g
(
I
)i
=w. So, we have to maximize v= v
(
g
)
=
w
h
p; 
g
(
I
)i
.
But since 
g
(
I
)
2R
+
l
and p2R
++
l
, we have
h
p; 
g
(
I
)i
> 0. As
h
p; 
g
(
I
)i
 0 8g 2G, con-
tinuity of v
(
g
)
follows directly from continuity of group action and scalar product on R
l
.
As w is xed, and w and
h
p; 
g
(
I
)i
are both positive, then the problem is equivalent to
minimizing
h
p; 
g
(
I
)i
for g 2G. 
In the remainder of this section we assume that referential preferences are given by a
subgroup of GL(l;R) which satisfy the following axiom:
Axiom 2
For consumer i 2 I, G
i
 GL(l; R), and the group action's : G
i
 R
+
l
 R
+
l
which
denes his preference relations on the commodity space R
+
l
, satises: there is a unique
g
i
2G
i
; such that 0<
h
I ; 
g
i
 I
i
6
h
I ; 
g
 I
l
i
;8g 2G
i
.
In the following theorem we can see the fundamental role of this group element g
i
, which
is to determine level of satisfaction v
max
and individual demand function. Then our ter-
minology of ``referential preferences`` is fully justied.
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Theorem 3. Let e
i
2 R
+
l
the initial endowment of consumer i whose preference is
dened by a group G
i
. Then its demand function is explicitly given by:
f
i
:R
++
l
 R
+
l
, f
i
(
p
)
=
w
i
v
p


I ; 
g
i
 I


g
p
 1
g
i
 I
where p= v
p

g
p
 I, and w
i
=
h
p; e
i
i
is the budget of consumer i.
Proof. Let p 2 R
++
l
the giving vector price. By theorem 2 the maximization problem is
equivalent to minimize
h
p; 
g
I
i
for g 2G
i
. But since p 2R
++
l
, there is g
p
2G
i
and v
p
>
0 ; such that p = v
p
(
g
p
 I). Then we have to minimize



g
p
I ; 
g
I

for g 2 G. Now,



g
p
I ; 
g
I

=


I ; 
(g
p
g)
 I

, and, by axiom 2, the minimum is given for g
i
= g
p
 g, or
equivalently for g = g
p
 1
 g
i
. Finally, v
max
=
w
i
v
p


I ; 
g
i
 I

and f
i
= v
max

g
p
 1
g
i
 I =
w
i
v
p


I ; 
g
i
 I




g
p
 1
g
i
 I

. 
Remark 4. Since p 2 R
++
l
, we can also write p = M
p
 I where M
p
is the diagonal
matrix with entries m
i;i
= p
i
> 0. In other word M
p
= v
p

g
p
 I and
1
v
p

g
p
 1  I =M
p
 1
 I,
and the individual demand function for consumer i takes this form:
f
i
(
p
)
=
h
M
p
 I ; e
i
i


I ; 
g
i
 I

M
p
 1

g
i
 I .
Corollary 5. The demand function is homogeneous of degree 0.
Proof. Let  2 R
+

, from the above expression of individual demand function, f
i
(
p
)
=
h
M
p
 I ; e
i
i


I ; 
g
i
 I


M
p
 1
 
g
i

 I. As M
p
is a diagonal matrix form of the p vector, then M
p
=
M
p
, and M
p
 1
=
 1
M
p
. This clearly implies f
i
(p)= f
i
(p). 
2 Referential preferences and conditions of equilibrium
We start with an example taken from (Aliprantis & al, 1989) to see how our groups'
based approach is able to provide same results as the conventional one based on utility
function.
Example 3
Let an economy with two commodities and three agents and note that (p
1
; p
2
) is the
vector price. Utility functions of agents are u
1
(x; y) = xy; u
2
(x; y) = x
2
y and u
3
(x; y) =
xy
2
, and their initial endowment are e
1
=

1
2

; e
2
=

1
1

and e
3
=

2
3

. These assump-
tions are extracted from example 1.4.10 in [Aliprantis and all].
For us, all preferences are given by groups and their actions on R
+
2
.
Consumer 1. The group of preference is the matricial subgroup G
1
=

 
t 0
0
1
t
!
; t > 0

: Its
maximization problem

Maximize v= v
X
subject to the budget constraint p
1
x+ p
2
y= b
1
where X = (x; y), is equi-
valent to nding the greatest v such that

P ; v
 
t 0
0
1
t
!

1
1


= p
1
+ 2p
2
since for each
X = (x; y) there is a unique t > 0 and v > 0 with X = v
 
t 0
0
1
t
!

1
1

.
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Then, we have to nd Max v > 0; such that v


p
1
p
2

;
 
t
1
t
!

= p
1
+ 2p
2
which gives:
v
h
tp
1
+
1
t
p
2
i
= p
1
+2p
2
 v=
t(p
1
+2p
2
)
t
2
p
1
+ p
2
.
Now, v = v(t) reaches its optimum when
dv
dt
= 0, and this occurs at t
0
=
p
2
p
1
q
. Since for
t=
p
2
p
1
q
> 0 we have
d
2
v
dt
2
< 0 , then we obtain v
max
= v(
p
2
p
1
q
)=
(p
1
+2p
2
)
2 p
1
p
2
p
.
An easy calculation establishes the demand for the rst consumer:
x
1
(p) =
0
B
B
B
@
p
2
p
1
q
0
0
1
p
2
p
1
r
1
C
C
C
A

(p
1
+2p
2
)
2 p
1
p
2
p 

1
1


=(
p
1
+2p
2
2p
1
;
p
1
+2p
2
2p
2
).
Same argument and relatively simple calculation gives the following results:
Consumer 2 The group is G
2
=

 
t 0
0
1
t
2
!
; t > 0

; v(t) =
t
2
(
p
1
+ p
2
)
p
1
t
3
+ p
2
reaches its maximum
at t=
2p
2
p
1
3
q
where v
max
=
p
1
+ p
2
p
1

2p
2
p
1

1/3
+ p
2

p
1
2p
2

2/3
. From this, we deduce that the demand
of the 2nd consumer is x
2
(p)=

2p
1
+2p
2
3p
1
;
p
1
+ p
2
3p
2

.
Consumer 3 The group is G
3
=

 
t
2
0
0
1
t
!
; t > 0

; the maximum of v(t) =
t
(
2p
1
+3p
2
)
p
1
t
3
+ p
2
is
reached at t
0
=
p
2
2p
1
3
q
, and v
max
=
2p
1
+3p
2
p
1
(
p
2
2p
1
)
2/3
+ p
2
(
2p
1
p
2
)
1/3
. Then we nd x
3
(p) =

2p
1
+3p
2
3p
1
;
4p
1
+6p
2
3p
2

as the demand of consumer 3.
To calculate the equilibrium price, it suces to establish the common equilibrium condi-
tion: Z(p) =
P
i=1
3
x
i
(p)  
P
i=1
3
e
i
= 0. It follows immediately that

16p
2
  13p
1
6p
1
;
13p
1
  16p
2
6p
2

= 0. The last equality gives, under the condition p
1
+ p
2
= 1, the value of
price equilibrium, p
eq
=

16
29
;
13
29

. All these results are exactly the same obtained by the
use of utility functions.
Based on the above examples and results, we suggest to dene a new mathematical
framework of an exchange economy where the set I of agents is nite. This is to be
dened as:
Denition 6.
An exchange economy is said to be of referential preferences if:
 The consumption set coincides with R
+
l
;
 Each agent ihas a non-zero initial endowment, i.e., e
i
2R
+
l
and;
 The preference relation 
i
is referential (denition 1), and satises axiom 2, for
all i2T .
The proof of our main result (theorem 8) is based on the following mathematical result.
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Theorem 7. Let S =

p 2R
l
; p
i
> 0 for i= 1; 2;  ; l; p
1
+ p
2
 + p
l
= 1
	
the set of all
strictly positive prices. For a function (  ) = (
1
(  ); 
2
(  );  ; 
l
(  )) from S into R
l
assume that:
i.  is continuous and bounded from below;
ii.  satises Walra's Law, i.e., p  (p)= 0 holds for each p2S;
iii.
f
p
n
g
S ; p
n
 p= (p
1
; ; p
l
) and p
k
> 0 imply that the sequence
f

k
(p
n
)
g
of
the k
th
components of
f
(p
n
)
g
is bounded; and
iv. p
n
 p2 @S with
f
p
n
g
S imply lim
n1
k
(p
n
)k
1
=1.
Then, there exists at least one vector p2S satisfying (p)= 0:
For proof of theorem 7 we refer the reader to (Aliprantis & al, 1989, Ch 1).
The main result of this paper is provided below:
Theorem 8.
Every exchange economy of referential preferences has an equilibrium price.
Proof. It is based on Theorem 7.
According to theorem 3 and remark 4, the excess demand function in ERP is given by
Z:S R
l
, Z(p)=
P
i
f
i
(
p
)
 
P
i
e
i
=
P
i2I
h
M
p
 I ; e
i
i


I ; 
g
i
 I

M
p
 1

g
i
 I   e,
where e=
P
i
e
i
2R
++
.
First, continuity of Z is a consequence of continuity of application: S GL(l;R); p
M
p
, the inversion of matrix, and scalar product on R
l
. And since all f
i
2 R
+
l
, then Z is
clearly bounded from below.
Second, as f
i
is the solution of maximization problem under the budget constraint then
h
p; f
i
(p)
i
=
h
p; e
i
i
, and
h
p; Z(p)
i
=0 follows from the equality: Z(p) =
P
i
f
i
(
p
)
 
P
i
e
i
.
Third, let now
f
p
n
g
 S ; p
n
 p = (p
1
;  ; p
l
) and p
k
> 0. To see why the sequence
f
Z
k
(p
n
g
of the k
th
components of
f
Z(p
n
)
g
is bounded, we consider remark 4 and this
expression of demand function:
P
i
f
i
(
p
)
=
P
i
h
M
p
 I ; e
i
i


I ; 
g
i
 I

M
p
 1

(

g
i
 I
)
. Since p
n
2S, then
the k
th
component of M
p
n
and M
p
n
 1
are nonnegative for all n and tend respectively to p
k
and (p
k
)
 1
, which clearly implies f
i
(p
k
n
) is bounded for all i 2
f
1; 2;  ; m
g
, and con-
sequently the same holds for
f
Z
k
(p
n
g
.
Last, it remains to prove that lim
n1
k
Z(p
n
)
k
1
=1 if p
n
 p 2 @S with
f
p
n
g
 S:
Let j 2
f
1; 2;  ; m
g
such that p
j
= 0. Then p
j
n
 0, and (p
j
n
)
 1
 +1 which implies
that the j
th
component of individual demand tends to innity, namely we have

M
p
n
 1

(

g
i
 I
)

j
 +1 for all consumer i. Since
h
M
p
 I ; e
i
i


I ; 
g
i
 I

> 0 for all i, then
(
f
i
(p)
)
j
 +
1, and it follows immediately that lim
n1
k
Z(p
n
)
k
1
=1. 
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Conclusion
In his theory of value, Gerard Debreu wrote: ``A state of the economy is a specication
of the action of each agent ... But these actions are not necessarily compatible with the
total resources. Can one nd a price system which makes them compatible? "(Debreu,
1959, p 74)
In this work we prove that if, all agents choose their preference in some group setting,
and make their choice in compliance with a simple general rule of referential nature, then
we can nd a system of price which makes all choices compatible.
An in depth work using additional examples will certainly allow us to come across other
properties of referential preference and to better grasp its economic interpretations.
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